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From an anthropological perspective, all individuals and groups, whether plant or 
animal, are diverse. 'Then the interestink empirical and theoretical questions become not how 
to maintain homogeneity, but, first, how and under what conditions is diversity is eliminated, 
and second, how and under what conditions are forms of unity achieved. The question I would 
like to pose today is how and under what conditions in East Central Europe following the 
collapse of socialism has diversity been eliminated and/or has unity been achieved. In 
particular I will explore the role of one institution, the prinaples of "the rule of law,"-an 
Enlightenment-inspired and very modernist set of prinaples-in making the transformation 
from "already-existing socialist states" to states more liberal-democratic in form. 
Furthermore, I will concentrate on one aspect of the rule of law-retributive justice: the 
rewarding of good, the punishment of wrongdoing-in this ongoing transformation I will use 
this focus-on the use, abuse, or non-use of retributive justice-to try to explain why, despite the 
display in democratization processes in all of East-Central Europe, certain states have 
established themselves as legtimate and have effected a change in state form under relatively 
peaceful conditions while others-Russia, rump Yugoslavia, Croatia, and Romania-are 
marked by a security- and a legitimacy crisis, expressed by an exponential increase in violence. . .. . . . . . . . .. . . 
This violence is directly expressed through the production and exteriorization of "minoritiesv-- 
-a placing outside of the group what formerly belonged inside. 
2 Comparison of regime transformations 
First, I'll begin with an empirical observation and 'with a sociological typology of 
regime transformations. The jural restructurings in East-Central Europe divide into three basic 
types of transformations. A first type is where the legal regime has changed abruptly yet 
smoothly, with some restitution for victims of the old regime but hardly any redconing with 
wrongdoing in the past-this has been the case in Slovenia, Poland, Hungary, and to a large 
degree in the Czech Republic, though there for different reasons. In Slovenia, Poland, and 
Hungary the regimes themselves initiated reform that enabled the participation of the 
opposition, making it difficult if not impossible to purge or prosecute former officials or public 
employees, or to review judges for past misdeeds. One of the first acts of the newly installed 
Slovenian government in March 1990, for example, was to stage a public ceremony where it 
apologized for violations in the past. In contradistinction to the other republics in the former 
Yugoslavia, its demands for self-determination were accompanied by the systematic 
implementation of legislation formulated to protect minority rights according to the norms put 
forth by the Parliament of Europe (Minnich 1993: 91). In Poland, there was only one 
prosecution, trial, and conviction-for the murder of a priest. In Hungary, there were several 
prosecutions of individuals responsible for putting down the 1956 revolution, no imprisonments, 
and no trials against officials for actions after 1956. Also, many argue that since the extent of 
criminality was much less in these regimes than in the other East Bloc states, there was less 
need for prosecution. 
In the former Czechoslovakia, President Havel, largely motivated by a desire to 
prevent a scapegoating of groups of state employees, sought to hinder such a reckoning, arguing 
instead for a form of collective guilt since all Czechs were complicitous, singling out any 
individuals for punishment would be unfair and unproductive. Thus government form initially 
changed while personnel, except at the very top, remained substantially the same. Judicial 
personnel were screened for secret police complicity, resulting in about 1% of the judges leaving 
service, with a smaller number of state prosecutors being demoted but not fired. Individuals 
working in state agencies have also been vetted, but the severest penalty has been demotion to a 
lesser position of authority; many of these cases have been appealed and most individuals 
reinstated. After 1992, the split between the Czech and Slovak Republics distracted attention 
from internal cleansing. In 1994 and 1995, however, Czech prosecutors made additional 
indictments with some trials already completed. Of the states in this first type, Hungary and 
the Czech Republic both engaged in major steps to rew6i.a-~7g%-6viiidiGhgGd- 
rehabilitating victims, adjusting pensions, and publicizing ads of contrition. 
A second type of transformation, where regime change, especially in the legal domain, 
has been more apparent than substantive, where there has been minimal recognition of victims 
and very little or no prosecution of wrongdoers, would be rump Yugoslavia, Croatia, Romania, 
and Russia, and perhaps all of the former Soviet Republics except the Baltic states. 
Yugoslavia disintegrated into a genocidal war, centered in Bosnia, victimizing most of the 
population in an attempt to create ethnically homogeneous territorial and political units. In 
Romania, the Ceaucescu couple were executed, their son put in jail, and the remaining members 
of the Politburo were given sentences from 15 to 20 years for a planned "genocide," as it was 
called, referring to the final Politburo meeting they had sat in where it was planned to squash 
the demonstrations in the fall of 1989. These acts of revolutionary justice against a small elite 
served as a substitute for any further cleansing; the same govenunent, state security, and public 
officials serve as before. In Russia, a new political class has arisen to compete with the old 
nomenklatura, but there has been no dismissal of judges or state prosecutors and no purge of 
offiaals. The Communist Party was declared illegal, but that act served, as in Romania, as a 
substitute victim, an alibi to prevent, at least for the time being, further rea-iminations against 
persons or structures responsible for past wrongs. 
A third type of transformation characterizes the Baltic states, Bulgaria, Albania, and 
Germany. In these states, there has been radical regime change, substantial compensation to 
former victims, and extensive prosecution of the old elite. In Bulgaria, several top government 
officials were put on trial, including three fonner Prime Ministers, who all went to prison. In 
the Spring and Summer of 1992, there was a widespread purge of former party otficials from the 
civil service and academic institutions and vetting of thousands of others (SmoUett 1993 13). 
As elsewhere in the East bloc, this reckoning stopped abruptly when former communists, now 
nationalists and private property owners, returned to power. In Albania, a number of former 
high officials and symbolically prominent persons, such as Nexhmije Hoxha, the wife of the 
former dictator, were arrested and tried in relatively late wave of trials in 1993 and 1994. And 
tens of thousands of people were dismissed from their jobs in a labor reform. But initially these 
trials and dismissals were widely interpreted through local idioms: as acts of personal revenge, 
or ways of demobilizing lawful opposition, rather than as attempts to rechQ past harms 
(Imholz 1995: 54-60). Given Albanian isolation from the international legal regime during the 
Cold War, such interpretations within a local idiom of revenge were to be expected. The 
majority of Germans after World War II held similar opinions of the Nuremberg Trials and 
began revising'their judgments only fifteen years after the adual event Hence for Albanians, 
this historical reckoning might form the memory base for future reinterpretations of the 
. ..- 
tranS6niation Jural-reforms in &e Baltic sGfes differ from state to state, and they continue to ' 
be in a state of flux because they have been intricately tied to an ongoing separation from the 
Soviet Union and from internal ethnic Russian (among other) "minorities." But all three Baltic 
states have engaged in substantial retributive justice. In Germany, the reckoning with the past 
has been of another scale compared to the other states. Before elaborating the German case, 
how does one explain the correlation between cyclical violence and retributive justice? 
3. Retributive Justice and the Control of V iolence 
First, what is retributive justice? Legal theorists, following Aristotle, most frequently 
divide justice into two types: distributive and corrective. Clearly, what I am dealuig with 
here is not distributive justice; the wrongs cannot be righted by dividing up the pie, by dealing 
each person his/ her proper share. As well, retniutive justice should not to be confused with 
corrective justice, a distinction Jean Hampton (1991: 1701), philosopher at the University of 
Arizona, has clarified. Corrective justice is concerned to "compensate victims for harms," 
meaning that a jural authority ads only when an actual injury or harm is suffered by a 
particular person, who is then identified as the victim deserving of remedy.l This remedy is 
corrective justice: it corrects the injury by compensating the victim for the harm suffered. By 
contrast, retributive justice seeks to "compensate victims for moral injuries." A moral injury is an 
agreed-upon wrong but need not necessarily result in a harm. The immorality of the deed lies 
not in the degree of hann suffered by the victim but in the wrongness of the deed itself. 
Attempted murder, for example, results in no harm but is nonetheless a wrong or a moral injury. 
In the case of a moral injury, the jural system focuses not on correcting a harm but on righting a 
wrong, It holds the wrongdoer accountable and by righting the wrong reestablishes the dignity 
of vidims. Such victims can be either groups or individuals (insofar as they exist and can be 
identified), or they can be the entire moral community which has been injured. 
In contrast to the dominant scholarly opinion among aiminal justice experts, I maintain 
that the two conditions-righting the wrong and reestablishing the dignity of the victim-are 
linked, and that both are necessary in order to prevent cycles of retributive violence. A rising 
standard of living, or the expectation of such, has a tenuous relation to peace; it is neither a 
necessary nor sufficient condition to halt group violence. Likewise,a falling standard of living 
will not in itself precipitate group violence. In ex-sodalist states where there has been no 
retributive justice, however, one can witness and even pdid cycles of retributive violence. My 
concern here is to determine under what conditions it is possible to stop a longterm cyde of 
violence, which, as history shows, is always latent in any group. If the principles of the rule of 
law are not installed and processually reaffirmed, a society will be confronted with a - . . -. - . - - . - .. . .- .. . - . . 
potentially endless cyde of +ioI'ent retaliahons. 
Although retribution is "neither the exclusive, nor perhaps even the primary, 
responsibility of the state ..., [the state is] an impartial moral agent of the entire co~munity. 
[It has] greater capacity to recognize the moral facts than any involved individual citizen" 
(Hampton 1991: 1693). Therefore, if the state wants to establish itself as a moral agent with 
legitimacy in the entire community, it has an obligation to pursue retribution where wrongdoing 
has occurred. This holds true particularly for demoaatic states. 
l~roblems of distributive justice, such as those explored by Michael Walzer, follow a logic 
closer to that of corrective than restitutive justice. Walzer has consistently argued from a 
position of cultural relativism in comparisons of judicial systems and conceptions of justice, often 
borrowing from anthropological representations of the dosed nature of cultural belief systems 
(see, e.g., Walzer 1983). If applied to Eastern Europe, his relativism would seem to support the 
assertion that socialist legal norms were separate and autonomous from liberal democratic 
legal norms, consequently making prosecution of wrongdoing extremely difficult if not 
impossible. In his most recent book, Walzer (1995) complicates his earlier position, arguing for 
a distinction between thick and thin moral standards, without however abandoning his earlier 
position regarding the autonomy of cultural systems from which a relativistic moral position 
necessarily must follow. 
3. Retributive Justice, Principles of Accountability, Demoaatic Rule 
In theory, democratic form distinguishes itself from all other political forms in one 
major respect its leaders are accountable to the public over which they rule. By contrast, in 
other political forms such as monarchies and dictatorships, leaders are held accountable to no 
one but themselves. The principles of German Rech tsstaa f Iich keit, or in English the "rule of 
law," represent an attempt to institutionalize this theory of accountability. Elaborated over 
the last nine centuries, these principles are not formally dependent on the democratic form 
alongside which they developed. In fact, they can coexist with other forms of political 
representation. However, principles of accountability are necessary to a democracy in a way 
they are not necessary to other political forms. These principles provide the framework for a 
process central to democraaes: they make transparent and predictable the relation of the 
sovereign to the ruled. They indude such axioms of government as separation of powers, the 
principle of legality, the demand that statute law find general application, the prohibition of 
excesses of state authority, assurances for an independent judiciary, a ban on retroactive 
B '  legislation. They address the minimal conditions necessary to legitimate the democratic 
p .  state's monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. Democratic legitimacy depends above all on 
a system of political and personal accountability that is institutionalized in the principles of 
the rule of law.2 
2 ~ m t  in the rule of. law .will not initially develop out of an a£€innation of the procedural 
guarantees alone, for these guarantees must first be installed. Hence the claim made by Jiirgen 
Habermas (1988: 277) in his Tanner Lectures on Human Rights, that the rule of law "draws its 
legitimacy from a rationality of legislative and judicial procedures guaranteeing 
impartiality," cannot be extended to the present context in East-Central Europe. By contrast, 
Foucault (1978) has criticized this pretext of impartiality, claiming that, as political 
authorities distance themselves from the responsibility for and machineries of violence 
through the institutionalization of rational procedures, these procedures tend to lead to more 
minute and indirect fonns of practical domination Along these lines, Michael Henfeld (1992 
156) argues that the modem state's bureaucracy is fundamentally involved in the "production of 
indifference," a process wherein "the state itself becomes a massive machine for the evasion of 
responsibility, while arguing that people should 'pay' for their crimes." Differences 
notwithstanding, all three writers share in common a concern for the difficulty inherent in 
turning the principles of accountability into actual practices. 
A way out of this tangle, at least theoretically, may be to follow Judith Sklar, who 
shifts the focus in The Faces of hestice by arguing that the core legitimacy question addressed 
by jural systems is not impartiality per se but a specific kind of moral response to perceived 
injustice. In other words, a jural system's validity does not rest primarily on its neutrality or 
objectivity (though I do not mean to minimize the significance of the perception of objectivity), 
but on the appropriateness of the response to the violation in question. What specific kind of 
moral response to perceived injustice is called for? The perception of injustice, writes Sklar 
(1990: 89) is "the one natural core of our morality. It is our most basic daim to dignity." Because 
injustice is an enduring feature of human life, the appropriate response is to address this 
"natural core" of morality by reaffirming our "most basic daim to dignity." Hence "dignity" is 
Among the most controversial aspects of this restructuring are the trials and 
aiminalizations of former political elites in East-Central Europe. In many ways, they are 
comparable to the Nuremberg Trials following World War 11. At Nuremberg and in other war 
trials, thousands of individuals were tried and convicted, hundreds executed. At the time, they 
were considered of dubious legality and conducted without precedent: The usual interpretation 
given to the legacy of Nuremberg has been that the trials set a precedent for the extension of 
human rights (cf. Janis 1993: 241-272). But today the Nuremberg trials stand out in another 
respect: as landmark legal processes of world historical sigruficance in holding govenunental 
officials accountable for wrongdoing. 
Largely because postwar democraaes have tended to rely on legal positivism, they also 
tend to displace criminality from the center to the margins, away from political leaders to 
border regions and provincial actors. Or they redefine the border regions and margins, in turn, 
as those areas that indude whatever is considered aiminal. A counter-process of locating crime 
in and not outside of government could have enduring consequences for international legal 
regimes and for legal process in different demoaaaes. To locate criminality in the center is to 
suggest that responsibility and accountability must be situated there also. Resistance to such 
attempts is massive, but the potentially enduring lessons of this attempt for the world's ruling 
elites can not be underestimated. Five years after the revolutionary change of regimes in East- 
Central Europe, how might we evaluate the performance of the new states in reckoning with 
their aiminal pasts and the rectification of injustices? 
First, w-eemusttnnOiean .~pparentparaao-x --a- has been little or no attempt to 
prosecute former authorities for wrongdoing in East bloc states-particularly rump Yugoslavia, 
Croatia, Russia, and Romania, societies have been marked by a cycle of violence and counter- 
violence, motivated by revenge and supported by some of the old elite, who have frequently 
resumed power under a nationalist platform Surely, thisviolence is directly linked to the 
trauma of the communist epoch as well as to the revolution directed against its aborted utopia. 
One often hears in the background resounding echoes of the thunder of the First and Second 
World Wars. By contrast, in those stat& where there have been successful prosecutions of 
former authorities for wrongdoing-particularly in East Germany, Bulgaria, and Albania, the 
trials have frequently provoked sympathy for the convicted and scorn for the original victim's 
moral daims. Moreover, where such trials have occurred, the people's initial passion for 
"retributive justice" appears to have substantially subsided, if not altogether disappeared. 
Many analysts claim that such prosecutions delegitimate new states. It seems as if  in all of the 
not something about which the modem state can remain neutral if it is to establish itself as the 
ultimate arbiter in deciding what is right and wrong. 
former socialist states, including East Germany, the possibility for a aiminahation of the old 
elite and retributive justice, for jural reform generally, existed for a period of only several years 
after the regime change. Yet, in most of the new states where some retributive justice has been 
. . 
pursued, the extant potential for violence seems to have been peacefully, if precariously and 
perhaps only tentatively, dampened or diverted. On the other hand, the states with the most 
violence are those where there was no attempt at retributive justice. 
What does a relative failure to continue public prosecution of 'aiminality undertaken 
by the old regime and public indifference to the fate of past victims mean? In what context 
should it be interpreted? Is it because people are more fundamentally concerned with wealth 
and prosperity (problems associated with the economy) than with justice and morality 
(problems associated with legal security)? Does this indicate, as Stephen Holmes of the 
University of Chicago (1994: 3336) and the Polish scholar Wiktor Osiatynski (1994: 36-41) 
concluded, a desire to close "the books on the aimes of the past"? Are we to evaluate, along 
with Osiatynski (1994: 36), "the failure of decommunization and resistance to the retributive 
phase of the revolution [as] ... one of the most important successes of the postcommunist 
transformation"? On the contrary, a successful reckoning with the criminal past obligates the 
state to seek retributive justice, and a failure to pursue retributive justice will likely lead to 
cycles of retributive violence. 
4. Displacing =olenaz Substitutevictims versus the Actual Perpetrator 
When socialist states dissolved, Gialist nikniitiviFsys'te-& went wi&-thea WHat'" 
- 
followed was an agonistic period of tremendous ambiguity about judgment and guilt, a 
delegimitation of legal systems with a corresponding increase in aiminalty at every level of 
the society. At stake in the installation of the rule of law in former soaalist states is whether 
it will be possible for the state to establish its ability to make legitimate moral judgments 
again. These moral judgments are political decisions, they involve violence, and they either 
displace or conceal that initial moment of violence. 
Until recently, anthropological contributions to the regulation of violence have come 
primarily from the study of societies without states. When compared to states with the rule of 
law, stateless societies tended to distinguish themselves in one central respect they practice 
forms of ritual sacrifice. Sacrifice of a substitute victim is understood as a preventive measure, 
embedded in religious pradices, that, argues Ren6 Girard in a summary and theorization of 
anthropological studies, serves to "polarize the community's aggressive impulses and redired 
them toward victims that may be actual or figurative, animate or inanimate, but that are 
always incapable of propagating further vengeance. The sacrificial process furnishes an outlet 
for those violent impulses that cannot be mastered by self-restraint The saaifiaal process 
prevents the spread of violence by keeping vengeance in check" (1977: 18). 
In the regime changes following 1989, the choice of saaificial groups has been 
predictable and hardly random external states or internal enemies, most often gypsies, Jews, 
and perceived foreigners. Association with "communism" has also served as a symbolic 
reservoir for pollution and therefore a substitute for actual wrongdoers. Thus communist parties 
or communist parties members have at times been targeted for purification A sociologically 
informed explanation for sacrifice would make it unnecessary to hold to an (untenable) 
psychology of personal revenge to explain what motivates sodeties to construct jural systems for 
regulating violence. Rather, jural systems are a response to the group's search for a moral 
authority, and this authority is attained in part through retributive justice, by righting a 
wrong in such a way that the victim's dignity-always socially defined-is re-established. At 
this very general level, one can identify two dimensions to the sacrificial process that hold for 
each of the new East-Central European regimes: (1) identifymg possible culprits to hold 
accountable, who then were vetted for cornpliaty with the secret police, tried for crimes, or 
simply vilified in media campaigns, and (2) assuaging injured parties through rehabilitation, 
vindication, compensatory payments, publication of their stories, or other similar measures. 
During this period of installation, East-Central European regimes have indeed relied 
on saaifices for many purposes: in order to fight corruption, to open institutions to renewal, and 
to assuage victims of the old regimes. But legal regimes with the rule of law differ in a crucial 
res* Gom all  others: The core of Their IegitimaCy rests in identifying the real wrongdoer, or 
at least in a theory that the actual perpetrator has been identified. And with this 
identification and trial, the state establishes itself as a moral authority acting for the whole 
co-. 
Alternatively,when societies without rule of law seek someone to hold accountable for 
the initial offense, the first suspect is often replaced by another, and another, in a chain of 
substitutes. A substitute is actually preferred, notes Girard, since it avoids the principle of 
perfect reciprocity-an eye for an eye-and therefore the necessity for a cycle of reciprocal acts 
of revenge that would unleash violence and lead ultimately to a sacrifice of the entire group. 
This substitute requires a "certain degree of misunderstanding," even deception, so that it 
appears the god himself is demanding the new (and final) victim. The sacrifice "serves to 
protect the entire community from its own violence" by suppressing dissensions, rivalries, 
jealousies, and quarrels. It stems the tide of indisaimhte substitutions and redirects violence 
into 'proper' channels," meaning outside the community and toward some exteriorized 
individual or group that "lacks a champion" (Girard 19n: 8,10). A substitute victim absolves 
the group of any further responsibility to seek redress for the initial crime. 
The problem for the rule of law is that the actual perpetrator may be too powerful, or it 
may be too unpalatable politically to prosecute him. In that case, the perpetrator cannot be 
read* exteriorized, cannot be placed "outside" the society. Hence, a major problem for a 
Rechtsstaat is determining not only who committed the crime, but also whom is it politically 
possible to exteriorize, to place outside the group? Which ethnic group, political elite, nation, 
minority group, or individual can be held accountable for committed wrongdoings without 
dividing the political community? Since 1989, every East-Central European society has been 
strugghng with this question, and the answer determines which offenses are held to be criminal 
and therefore worthy of prosecution It is my thesis that in those states where there occurred a 
debate about moral responsibility and where there was no immediate exteriorization of p l t ,  
the new Rechtsstaat performed a successful "final judgment," in the religious sense, a 
performance that will ultimately enable the state itself to function as a moral agent and settle 
accounts. The definition of the collectivity provided by the state at this moment is likely to 
occasion more conflict than consensus. But it is not the level of conflict but the belief in its fair 
arbitration that is the key to a peaceful outcome. 
Alternately, in those places where the individual or group held accountable was not a 
purification from an acknowledged inside, where no internal cleansing and only scapegoating of 
already externalized others occurred, then further cycles of retributive violence are likely to 
follow. Cycles of violence will follow either as new waves of internal purges (of exteriorized 
others) or as foreign wars. Maurice Bloch (1982: 6) makes a very similar claim in his account of 
the'pblitics of religious experience, noting that thk v m  =ofinsu&ptiofi [of ;-*-native +~-sQ"]-& 
outwardly directed toward other species," or alternately, is "merely a preliminary to 
expansionist violence against neighbors." 
To describe the absence of retributive justice-the failure to acknowledge victims, 
prosecute regime-related crime, and establish standards of moral accountability-as a sign of 
"one of the most iinportant successes of the postcommunist transformation" (Osiatynski 1994: 36) 
effaces the actual efforts made in all of former socialist states to install the Rechtsstaat as a 
moral authority. If ongoing efforts to introduce standards of political accountability and 
responsibility fail, defenses of the newly installed Rechtsstaat will be reduced to arguments for 
a set of superior procedural techniques for getting things done.3 But, as I have been arguing, the 
31he issue of accountability has been frequently disamed in ethnographic monographs, but it 
has usually been presented within discussions of rationality (e-g, whether the reasoning used 
was formally consistent and logical) or within discussions of human agency. For example, 
Evans-Ritchards (1976) account of Azande causal reasoning has been used in both dixussions. 
For an exception to this, see James Ferguson's (1993: 78-92) pointed critique of technickt 
reasoning in "structural adjustment" programs, where he redirects the discussion to one of human 
responsibility-or, as I am a r m  accountability-for the moral outcomes of economic policies. 
legitimacy of getting things done through democratic political form rests on a pior installation 
of the prinaples of the rule of law. Often this defense of the new East-Central European 
regimes is further reduced to a kind of cargo cult argument about the new regime's ability to 
bring home the bacon, to generate wealth and private prosperity by respecting capitalist 
property laws: let bygones be bygones and let's all get wealthy together. It is frequently 
asserted that ethnic homogeneity, economic growth, or acts of reconaliation alone will 
legitimate the transformed Ostblock states. But who is buying that today? The single most 
signhcant and immediately noticeable result of the regime changes has been a massive 
redistribution of property and the creation of a wider range of economic class differences than 
previously existed. What seems to have made the most difference in peaceful and effective 
jural transformations is the use or absence of retributive justice. In those states where 
retributive justice had no hearing, proponents of the revolutions of 1989 have lost or are losing 
their moral authority, and members of the old apparatus have reasserted former privileges 
and prerogatives as well as often become the primary benefactors of the property reforms. A 
political community cannot legitimate itself on the basis of procedural impartiality and 
technical rationality alone, as, for example, some of Habennas' arguments suggest. A moral 
community also requires belief in a superior morality of politics, a politics perceived as just. 
The other side of the coin to the question of accountability is that of the place of the 
victin Efforts to vindicate or rehabilitate victims seek to reestablish their self-worth and 
value through the staging of an "event" that publidy repudiates the message of superiority or 
d6miiGmce tlGt iiiitially caused the diminishment iii &S victim's worth; "Whatever d&ions 
we do make will, however, be unjust," Sklar (1991: 126) reminds us, unless we take the victim's 
view into full account and give her voice its full weight Anything less is not only unfair, it is 
also politically dangerous." Cydes of violence can ultimately destroy the group; certainly 
they create conditions of permanent insecurity and instability. What discredits the legal 
system is its inability to displace violence onto itself: it fails to secure a monopoly on the 
legitimate use of violence. This displacement is successful only when a system of accountability 
is established whereby wrongdoers are punished and the dignity of victims is reestablished so 
that the injured party does not feel compelled to turn to violence to exact retribution 
If I am correct in following a long line of political theorists who maintain that the 
state strives not for moral neutrality but, as Hampton writes, "to implement a moral world 
through its decisions to punish or not to punish wrongdoers, then our next question concerns 
which crimes is it the state's business to punish? And what are the justifications for these 
. .  mmmahations? Law, in this view, does not exclude politics but requires a set of political 
decisions that reinforce a particular vision of dignity. The end of the Cold War has renewed 
debates about the prevailing definitions of human "dignity" that were embedded in the Cold 
War order. Installation of the new practices of the rule of law with the corresponding symbolic 
meanings involves defining which crimes are the state's business to punish, whom to re* and 
whom to hold accountable for injustices that, though now concentrated in the "socialist past," 
are continuous and ongoing. The jural reform in East-Central Europe, then, though ostensibly 
about eliminating past injustices, is more centrally about defining the future parameters along 
which the legitimate state not only has moral obligations but itself can claim to represent 
morality. 
5. Accountability on Trial in East germ an^^' ZERV 
What has happened when former government officials of East Bloc states are put on 
trial? When accountability is placed in the center, how does this frame the transition? Do 
such trials both alleviate the move to exteriorize minorities and legitimate the new 
Rechtsstaat? Rather than go into a single ethnographic case within a country, or try to cover 
all states in comparable detail, I will summarize and evaluate the results of retributive justice 
in East Germany. For reasons of length alone, I will offer more details about punishing 
wrongdoers than about rewarding the good. Fuller accounts, with individual cases, can be found 
in Borneman (1997). 
Most of the individual cases of prosecution would illustrate not the establishment of 
clear principles but the challenges of bringing about justice and establishing principles of 
accountability in East- Central Europe: the difficulty of making clear distinctions between 
aiijiiiiial-and ' v i m ,  the difficulties inherent iri an onnginqitallation of the principles of 
the rule of law, and the interhvining of sodalist and Western European legal regimes during 
the Cold War. 
In Germany, the major task of retributive justice fell to a special investigative unit 
called ZERV. How it came into existence is a story about the possibilities for the creation of 
retributive justice. In the chaos that followed the opening of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 
1989, illegal activities of an unprecedented nature proliferated to such an extent that police 
and public prosecutors in East and West Berlin felt overwhelmed. They immediately 
reestablished the contacts that had been destroyed with the division of Germany in 1949. 
Officials in the Ministries of Justice commiserated with the police and public prosecutors about 
diffculties encountered in responding to the deluge of demands for justice. These demands 
involved investigating and prosecuting both old crimes committed by the GDR's elite and new 
aimes made possible by the disintegration of East Gennan authority and, what at that time 
was not apparent, the impending unification of the two ~ t a t e s . ~  On the day of unification, 
October 3, 1990, West Berlin police absorbed the East Berlin "Volkspolizei" (People's Police) 
and fired nobody immediately. By contrast, West Berlin's Ministry of Justice dismissed all of 
East Berlin's public prosecutors and judges. Although these East German avil servants were 
encouraged to reapply for their positions, in the following four years only 15 percent of the 281 
new judges and public prosecutors who had worked in East Berlin were reappointed. Thirty 
percent retired or willingly left public service, with the remaining 55' percent actively rejected 
by the Ministry. Outside of Berlin, judges and public prosecutors were not all initially 
dismissed, and the rates of reappointment were much higher: e.g, Saxony 65 percent, 
Brandenburg 54 percent (Peschel-Gutzeit cited in Der Tagesspiegel1994: Because of the 
centralized nature of the GDR's police and judiaal units, the major archives and federal 
4After the fall of 1989, East German courts were literally inundated with demands for justice. 
The number of cases in labor courts alone increased by 742 percent in 1990 alone. The case 
overload, and accompanying backlog, continued to grow after unification In the province of 
Brandenburg, for example, between 1991 and 1992, the total number of cases delayed because of 
court overload increased 57 percent from 9,145 to 16,000 (Berliner Zeitung, January 20, 1992, p. 
14). Meanwhile, by the end of 1994, the number of East Germans going to court began to reach 
West German proportions. In Berlin, for example, the number of civil cases rose 273 percent 
between - 1991 and 1994 (Der Tagesspiegel October 10,1!994,p. 10). 
5Ihe dis- and re-qualifications for avil  servants (criteria for disqualification in private 
businesses was not covered by the law) were uneven between and within the new Lhder. Only 
in East Berlin were the criteria uniform, and there, as explained above, only judges and state 
prosecutors were .dismissed; other avil servants, including police and teachers, remained in.-- 
their posts though most were later vetted for Stasi activity by the Gaudc-Authority. This was 
possible only because West Berlin had a large enough staff and was physically dose enough to 
take over the jural administration of the entire eastern part of the city. 
The fate of occupational groups who were subject to disqmhfication varied: among 
teachers in Berlin, 4.7 percent were implicated but only -99 percent dismissed (Gaudc 1995a: 5); 
among lawyers in private practice, of 304 reviewed, four were disqualified (Der Tagesspiegel, 
October 1,1994, p. 10). The Unity Treaty of August 31,1990, envisioned continuity in avil 
servants but also obligated the new h d e r  to review civil servants for qualification and 
suitability for the position. Unlike "denazification" following World War II, political party 
affiliation was not used a a criteria (given that 97.6 percent of all GDR judges were members of 
the Sodalist Unity Party, this would have made reappointment all but impossible (Berliner 
Zeitung, January 15,1992, p. 10). A single criterion was listed as ground for dismissal: 
"Tatigkeit," activity connected with the Stasi. It did not specify whether this included those 
who merely had contact ("Kontakt") or those who worked with ("Zusammenarbeit") or those 
who worked for ("Mitarbeit) the Stasi. The Unity Treaty did, however, rule out consideration 
of political party membership (which had been the American criteria for de-Nazification). 
The different review commissions shared an assumption of an "objective" perspective, which 
entailed the search for an "objective" aiterion from which to review GDR personnel Although 
this insistence upon an objective standpoint intended to take into consideration conditions in the 
GDR, instead, it meant, as Diemut Majer has pointed out, that historically specific 
circumstances of behavior were ignored. On the other hand, resistance to forming a "catalogue 
of criteria" (because it was impossible to arrive at or agree on an "objective" one) facilitated 
arbitrary and variable application of standards for review (1992: 147-167). 
ministries had been located in or around Berlin. For this and a variety of other reasons, the 
task of investigating and prosecuting the old and new aime was left primarily to West Berlin 
officials. 
Approximately eleven months following unity, on September 1,1991, the German 
Bundestag, Chancellor Kohl, the Federal Ministry of Interior, and the Ministry of Justice 
followed a recommendation of a conference of interior ministers to create the "Zentrale 
Ermittlungsstelle Regierungs- und Vereini~ngskriminalitat" (ZERV) (Central Investigative 
Office for Governmental and Unification Gimidity).  On that date, ZERV began with a team 
of three men, working under the leadership of Manfred Kittlaus and the auspices of Berlin's 
President of the Police, to coordinate the different ongoing investigations into governmental 
and unification crime. Public Prosecutor Christoph Schaefgen became the leader of the division 
"Regierungskrimiditiit" in the Ministry of Justice. Since then, ZERV has become one of the 
"five pillars" of the Berlin police department. 
ZERV was charged with investigating what has become known as the "strafrechtliche 
Bewatigung der Vergangenheit der DDR" (overcoming of /redconing with the GDR's past 
through criminal law). Technically, it's function is to gather and prepare the evidence for the 
state, and then to prosecute, in cases involving the GDR A federal law passed in 1994 obligates 
. the police and public prosecutors to complete all of their work, except for cases involving 
murder, by 2 October in the year 2000. In private intenriews with public prosecutors and ZERV 
employees, I was told that while ZERVs investigations and prosecutions of governmental 
. . . ... 
cnrmnaliQ will liEely end bj the-yeif 2000,'i6.iili;&tigati6is of'&nodc tiiihes we% growiig 
and would continue well into the next century. 
ZERV is divided into two divisions: Referat 1 deals with unification criminality, 
Referat 2 with governmental a imidi ty .  Unification crimhdity refers to crime having to do 
with the economic background and consequences of unification, in other words, primarily with 
aime that took place after November 1989. About half of the suspects here come from the old 
h d e r  of the Federal Republic, half from the GDR In fact, most of ZERV 1's investigations 
are of suspected criminal activities engaged in jointly by organized criminal gangs from the old 
Federal Republic of Gennany, or other West bloc states, and by former members of the East 
German state security (Stasi) or former GDR functionaries in the political parties and mass 
organizations (Kittlaus 1993a. 4). 
"Crimen is a socially constructed category of wrong and unjust deeds; such acts are by 
definition both socially disapproved and legally prohibited. Needless to say, the definitions 
of aime vary by place and over time. ZERV has taken wrong actions and tried to construct them 
as violations of justice or "crime." This process is a fluid and intera&ve one, where the public 
pressures the state to read to wrongness and where the state prosecutes wrongness to which the 
public responds. Often public pressure will be insuffiaent to prompt state action, and the 
perceived wrong will remain a misfortune. Or, alternately, state action will find no resonance 
and support in the public, leading the state to avoid or truncate prosecution, and the designated 
wrong will go unpunished. In either case-of the action remaining a misfortune from the 
public's perspective or a designated wrong from the state's-the deed fill not become a "crime." 
In short, crime is never merely what is written in penal codes. It is a result of a complex 
interaction between the public and the state. And it is an interpretive process, involving the 
selection of categories of "wrongness" for investigation, the construction of evidence, and a trial. 
Shortly after its founding, ZERV 1 organized itself into roughly ten different 
investigative units, with much overlap between units in suspects and sources for evidence : 1) 
'Transferrubel" fraud, 2) property of the former Socialist Unity Party (SEDIPDS) and of mass 
organizations, 3) the Ministry of State Security (Stasi), 4) the Treuhandanstalt, 5) the currency 
union, 6) "Kommerzielle Koordinienmg" (KoKo), a GDR agency set up to accumulate convertible 
(Western) currency, 7) extortion, 8) Western groups of the former Soviet army, 9) embargo 
violations, and 10) weapons sales. Taken together, these ten unit. are intended to account for an 
estimated total of 26.5 billion D-Mark($17.7 billion) in damages between October 1990 and the 
fall of 1993. By the end of 1995, ZERV investigations were underway for 13.5 billion of this 
totaL Approximately 3 billion D-Mark has already been recovered since work began in 1990. 
ZERV 2 investigates high-level representatives of the party and govenunent as well as 
state functionaries who committed crimes while carrying out their offices. These crimes are 
.. -. . . - -. - . . . .  . . - . . . - -  
acts of violence ag&t humans and o f t e n i n v o l v e ' h ~ ~  rights violations. ~ y ' t h e  nd of 1995, 
ZERV 2 had investigated 7414 incidents. Moreover, seventy percent of all the investigations of 
ZERV 2 ,  and over half of the overall total of ZERV investigations, have been for either 
attempted or completed homicides (Kittlaus 1993b: 38). The acts investigated took place over 
the entire period of GDR history, from 1949 to 1989, and the people subject to investigation 
worked at all levels of the state hierarchy, from postal employees to members of the Politbiiro. 
Of the 4691 individual suspects, 213 held high-level posts (first lieutenant, major, major- 
general, general, ministers of state) (Kittlaus 1994: 29). 
The Public Prosecutor's Office lists three major areas of aiminal prosecution, while 
ZERV 2 divides its criminal investigations into roughly nine categories: 1) border violations, 2) 
contract murder by the Stasi, 3) kidnapping, 4) deaths on the Baltic Sea, 5) "Rechtsbeugung," 
(judiaal illegality), 6) repression of the GDR worker rebellion on June 17,1953,7) doping of 
athletes, 8) forced relocation in 1952 and 1%1, and 9) enviro~nental crime. The Public 
Prosecutor's Office has made indictments in three general areas: 1) "attempted and completed 
manslaughter on the inner-German border," 2) "Rechtsbeugung in acts involving imprisonment or 
manslaughter though the judicial organs of the GDR," and 3) "manslaughter, imprisonment, 
and violation of mail privacy by members of the Stasi" (Schaefgen 1994: 151) 
How successful has ZERV been? A complete List of the results of investigations, 
indictments, and verdicts is nowhere to be found. But even a partial list indicates that the 
results cannot be inferred from the numbers alone, which in any case are changing over time. In 
the fall of 1994, the head state prosecutor in Berlin, Christoph Schaefgen, drew up an initial 
list At that time he concluded that on the basis of the numbers alone, the results "look 
meager" (1994: 159). From October 3,1990, through the fall of 1994, ZERV 2, charged with 
investigating governmental criminality, had opened 3,000 cases, of which 100 had resulted in 
indictments. In only tlurty cases were suspects convicted, making a one percent conviction rate, 
30 convictions out of 3000 cases opened; or, if one measmes convictions per indictment, the success 
rate is tlurty percent (Der Tagesspiegel, October 1, 1994: 10). After this release, the press along 
with most intellectual commentators widely criticized the work of ZERV and the public 
prosecutor. 
A new evaluation by Berlin's Ministry of Justice that considers events through March 
31,1%6, indicates a changing picture. Consider again for a moment merely the more 
controversial work of ZERV 2 on unification crime. It had opened 5,807 cases, out of which 167 
resulted in an indictment. With 159 trials completed, in 73 cases suspects were convicted (some 
verdicts are on appeal), making a 2.5 percent conviction rate, 73 out of 5,807 cases opened; or, if 
one measures convictions per indictment, the success rate is 46 percent (Senatsveraltung 1996: 
Anlage 1). Depending on liow the numbers iire tabulatd, the iâ fe-of con+iction has incieaSed 
slightly, from one to 2 5  percent, or h m  30 to 46 percent ZERV 1, charged largely with 
economic crime, has engaged in even more investigations (19,264) and issued more indictments 
(300), though no numbers are available on convictions. These findings are summarized in the 
two tables below. 
Chart I. Cases Opened, Closed, Uncompleted, and Indictments of ZERV 1 and ZERV 2, March 
31,1996 
ZERV 1 ZERV 2 
Cases opened 19,264 5,807 
Cases dosed 11,873 4,074 
Indictments 300 167 
Uncompleted cases 7,391 1,733 
(Source: Senatsverwaltung fiir Justiz 19%: Appendix 1-6) 
Chart Ik Indictments and Convictions of ZERV 2 (Governmental Criminality), March 31,1996 
Type of Criminality Indictments Convictions 
Border violations 69 45 
38 Judicial illegality 7 
Stasi illegality 14 2 
Economic illegality 38 19 
(Source: Senatsverwaltung fiir Justiz 1996: Appendix 1-6) 
In sum, there have been tens of thousands of investigations, there have been hundreds of 
indictments, there have been some convictions holding both minor and major figures 
accountable, and a great deal of money has been recovered from economic crime. By and large, 
however, these successes have been too few in number and too costly in time and attention to 
convince a large number of people, especially legal experts and politicians in the new Germany, 
of the necessity and appropriateness of the aiminal investigations and prosecutions. 
The head Berlin prosecutor, Christoph Schaefgen, responds to public reservations by 
arguing that "justice is obligated to the principle of legitimacy and not that of public or 
political opinion" He suggests that the task of justice here lay in "enlightenment and in the 
prosecution of criminality and criminals who in exercising political power violated the law of 
their own states, not in reparations ("Wiedergutmachung") for wrong that originated in the 
former GDR (1994: 159). Clearly, a full account of the results of reckoning with GDR's past 
through aiminal law means more than listing trial results. To focus on trial results alone, that 
is, on the conviction or acquittal of suspeds, places jural work in an economistic frame of 
reference. Effiaency of justice becomes the primary aiterion by which results, or 
the"rationalityn of jural process, are evaluated. Such a framework may be useful in the domain 
of distributive justice, where outcomes most frequently involve material goods whose value can 
be dearly measured. Employing this logic, the political scientist Jon Elster (1992: 15) went so 
far as to claim that since everybody in former sodalist states was harmed, and "because it is - -  - - - - -- 
impossible to reach everybody, nobody should be punished and nobody Surely, 
comprehensiveness and outcomes that correspond to rational actor logic are not what criminal 
justice is about Justice is about morality and the prinaple of legitimacy, which in turn rest not 
on efficiency but on various cultural standards of effectiveness. The question is not whether 
criminal justice is effinent but whether it is e w e  in reckoning with a past. It is important 
not to impose a single efficiency standard on justice systems, for the particular means by which 
effectiveness is measured varies. I would think that most justice systems have never been 
particularly efficient, since in most places of the world most crimes are never solved and most 
suspected aiminals go free. Effectiveness, on the other hand, is a culturally and temporally 
6~nother  argument often put forward is that property owners should be preferred for restitution 
daims because at least it is possible to determine the amount of damage they suffered, whereas 
intangible forms of harm are impossible to compensate for fairly. Offe and Enker  counter: "It 
would be morally irrelevant to let the choice of rectificatory strategies be guided and distorted 




variable standard, and a matter for not speculative but empirical research. In the German case, 
have the criminal investigations and trials been efficacious? 
The head of ZERV, Manfred Kittlaus, justifies the criminal investigations in terms of 
three desired effects: 1) "Rechtsgefiihl" defined as "the direct effect on the people's respect for 
legality," 2) trust in the "soziale Marktwirtschaft" (social market economy) by dealing with 
"organized economic aime," and 3) improving the "appearance of Germany abroad." Respect 
for the legality ("Rechtsgefiihl") can be obtained, writes Kittlaus, only by fulfilling the 
"Verpflichtung" (obligation and commitment) to the "10,000 victims and the 100,000 GDR 
citizens who in 1989 worked to bring about the collapse of the morally, politically, and 
economically bankrupt GDR-system" (Kittlaus: 1994: 1). The primary groups to whom criminal 
reckoning is obligated, then, he argues, are the victims and the citizens who worked to bring 
about the collapse of the GDR 
Even those who have long opposed this redconing through criminal justice, such as the 
senior editor and owner of Die Zeit, Marion Griifin Donhoff (1994: I), the political scientist 
Egon Bahr (1993)) and the legal historian Uwe Wesel(1995), for example, have had 
reservations about ignoring the feelings of the victims. In pleading for an end to the criminal 
reckoning and a general amnesty, Wesel wrote, 'The single serious argument against an amnesty 
is the fee- of the victims. But everyone must make a contribution to the new beginning. Also 
the victims." Instead, he proposed a law of restitution "for which the sentencing of 
perpetrators is no substitute." He also insisted that the actual "reckoning with the past ... is 
&e'Gsk of liisiorians ariyway, who are already at work ... The Honecker trial has brought 
nothing new to light that was not already well-known" (1995: 3). Fmally, he also argued for 
an end to aimhahation through an amnesty, which, he claimed, was one of the reasons for 
the West Germany success story when former Nazis were amnestied in 1950. The question he 
addresses but did not ask is: whose trust in the new West German law is he most concerned with, 
that of the perpetrators or the victims? Both groups are actually small in number. Regardless 
of with whom one identifies, it is unlikely that amnestying suspects before they are brought to 
trial, before there is any finding of innocence or admission of guilt, will contribute to putting the 
past behind. 
What Wesel seems to confuse is the task of the historian-to bring something new to 
light, to make the unknown known--and the task of the justice system-to reestablish the 
dignity of the victim and to prevent further wrong-doing. The latter task cannot be readily 
accomplished by historians whose (ideal-ized) function is diligent research, the uncovering of 
new evidence, constructing of events and interpreting them in new frameworks. Rather, re- 
establishing dignity would seem to require a process more similar to a criminal trial than to 
historical research, namely, a public participatory process, like that of Dr. Vogel's trial, 
where following an open hearing one draws a thick h e  between the victim and those 
accountable for the injustice. Moreover, laws of restitution, like Wesel proposes, invariably 
rely on monetary dispensations, so that again an economistic framework is imposed on a jurai 
soiution. Jewish victims of the Holocaust who received monetary sums from the West German 
government in its Wiedergutmachung policy have by no means renounced the use of criminal 
justice to hold individuals accountable for criminal actions. A law of monetary restitution is 
desirable (and indeed, has already been passed) but not in itself sufficient for settling accounts. 
Individuals must also be held accountable for wrongdoing, and the state, I have been arguing, as 
the only institutional moral representative of the entire community, has an obligation here. 
The state's obligation is not only a hermeneutic one but also a performative one. Its primary 
concern is with the consequences of what it does for legitimating the principles of its rule. 
In those states that did not hold anyone accountable, where it was assumed that the 
system was at fault and changing "the system," whatever that is, would in itself be sufficient, 
there has been a form of sacrifice or ritual purification in reckoning with the past. but in each 
case the earmarked victim for saaifice-the "minority"chosen to exteriorize-has been 
different. In Czechoslovakia no serious internal criminalization took place, rather the Czechs 
. - c31rmnalized the Slovaks, who in turn criminalized the Czechs.7 Such practices of "ethnic 
deansing" are expressions of an atavistic drive for retaliation, in which perpetrators and 
victims of the past strike at each other in new coalitions. Responsibility for past problems was 
exteriorized, projected onto an "outside" that had at one time been part of oneself. As soon as 
this split between Slovaks and--Cz& was finalized, debate h e d  to the old +estion of -the 
grounds for the sacrifice immediately after World War I1 of almost three million Germans, or 
individuals identified as such, who were driven from their homes. These Sudetendeutsche 
living in Germanv, or the young people who want to identify themselves that way and who 
had never personally suffered this harm, in turn called for retaliation. 
In Romania, the Ceausescu couple and the Politbun, on top served as the objects for 
internal purification, though in the first moments of euphoria most European observers did not 
even notice that this ritual was accompanied by a scapegoating of Romanian Gypsies and 
Hungarians on the bottom Partly through these substitute s a d c e s  the old power structure 
was actually In Russia, political elites seemingly accountable to no one sacrificed -. 
Chechnya in a similar way, though one of the pecuharities of the Russian case is that leaders 
still want to control what they identify as external to them. In Yugoslavia, archenemies 
Croatia and Serbia united. to sacrifice Bosnia-and by many measures they have succeeded. 
7 ~ o l y  reports that in opinion polls carried out in 1991, "92 percent of Czechs weie of the opinion 
that the Slovaks benefited more from the common state than they did themselves and 86 
percent of Slovaks expressed the opposite view" (1994: 810). 
These regimes "secured" their rule not through the legitimate domination of the rule of law but 
in genocidal acts of exclusion and abjection of an internal other. Moreover, an active, non- 
elected clique of former perpetrators and victims directly incited and manipulated the 
violence. To be sure, the Croats and Serbs did not a d  alone but with the complicity of the 
international community, induding the aid of M e n t i s t  populations in Europe and the United 
States. But if we focus solely on the role of the jural "transitions," in as much as the word 
applies to this situation, they were most frequently subordinated to strategic political 
operatives, which in turn were directed by former perpetrators who readily identified new 
scapegoats-the Bosnian Muslims, inter-ethnic couples-on whom the ethnonationalists could 
project their feelings of guilt. 
In none of these states did former victims receive much recognition; there was little or 
no retributive justice and internal cleansing; accountability was shifted from the political 
center to some posited exterior, which was then sacrificed. Ln Hungary, Slovenia, and to a large 
extent in Poland, some people claim no sacrifice was necessary since state form was already a 
"rule of law" and therefore the transformation was not from one type of regime to another but 
within the regime. This may be true. And, indeed, the relative inclusiveness of these regimes 
is to be applauded. But one should not overlook the reappearance of anti-sexnitism in Poland, 
espeaally given its history of dealing with internal divisions through demarcation from its 
minorities, including a history of recurrent pogroms. And in Slovenia, state functionaries have 
had it easy escaping personal accountability and responsibility for their own errors by pointing 
the finger at their dangerous and barbarian neigh665 &d fonner federal comkdes ih S;erbia, 
Croatia, and Bosnia. 
The political transformation in Germany since 1989 is a part of this political and 
psychological dynamic in the former East bloc For this reason, reestablishing the dignity of 
victims required a prosecution of perpetrators among the old elite for their moral-legal wrongs. 
But since the state's legitimacy is now tied to the principles of the rule of law, it must also, 
especially in the hours of its birth, avoid criminalizing politically expedient substitutes. It 
must prosecute and punish actual wrongdoers, with the understanding that for a variety of 
political and procedural reasons it will not be able to punish them all. The old East German 
political elites and their West German accomplices do not fall into the category of substitute 
victims for they are being held accountable for what they actually did. Nothing more, nothing 
less. And when, as has most frequently been the case, it is impossible to convict following the 
procedural protections of the principles of the rule of law, the new state has not thereby failed, 
for each trial must be viewed alongside other prosecutions. The major sigruficance and efficacy 
of a trial is not always the guilty verdict. Rather, a trial demonstrates through its 
performance the ongoing necessity of reiterating the state's moral principles. Effective 
criminal law is not to be equated with efficient justice. Efiectiue criminal law establishes the 
state as a moral agent representing the entire cornmunify by reiterating the +nciples of 
responsibility and accountable for injustices as part of an attempt to reestablish the dignity of 
victims. 
That the justice system has been effective is attested to by another kind of evidence: 
steadily increasing public trust in the judiciary indicated in public opinion polls. Of all the 
institutions in the united Germany with whom citizens are asked to identify, the institution 
with which eastern and western Germans trust most is the Constitutional Court, followed 
closely by the other courts and the police. At the bottom of this list are the press and the 
political parties. In the middle and far below the judiaal branch are the legislative branch 
and the military (Gabriel 1993: 3-12). 
Is it possible to go beyond the endosed scenario of the trial and the jural system at 
work, and beyond the reactions of victims, to describe ethnographically everyday reactions to 
and ramifications of retributive justice? I am, after all, claiming that a relationship exists 
between the use of retributive justice and the creation of social peace. Where, exactly, does one 
locate the situations in which retributive justice is received? One of the major problems here is 
that the primary descriptive evidence to which I am appealing is a nonevent: the lack of 
violent demonstrations directed against one's neighbors, the willingness to defer in soda1 
conflicts to the state's courts and administrative bodies. 
On the surface, the major evidence to be explained would be the significant increase in 
violence perpetrated against foreigners in both 1991 and 1W more than 2000 acts, including 
the bombing and burning of homes of asylum seekers and the 17 murders by right-wing groups, of 
which eight of the victims were foreigners. At that time, the Office of Constitutional 
Protection estimated that political parties of the radical right in eastern and western Germany 
had about 40,000 members, of whom 6,000 were ready to use violence.8 Equally if not more 
disturbing than these s p d c  acts of murder was the acceptance, often extending to support, of 
this violence by a large number of German bystanders. 
This violence quiddy subsided, however, largely in response to a concerted effort by the 
state to investigate and isolate these perpetrators, and by large numbers of individual atizens 
d 
to identify with the victimsb?e groups to which they belonged. In the fail of 1992, several 
million East and West Germans demonstrated publicly their opposition to this violence, 
organizing peaceful marches and demanding that politicians and police take resolute action to 
stop the violence. Following these demonstrations, politicians and significant numbers of 
relatively apolitical citizens h e  spurred into action against this new wave of right- 
8 ~ h i s  Week in Gennany, 12 November 1992,l. 
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wing violence. This action alone did not stop the violence, though it did demonstrate an 
unwillingness to go along. One may aiticize the kinds of the various responses, but they are 
dear indications of a successful refusal to exteriorize a part of the social group. And they were 
in fad effective in preventing the violence from escalating. 
There are of course many other factors which have contributed to the many non-events 
marking the relatively peaceful transition in Gemany. Above all, there is the well- 
developed Germ& social welfare system which cushioned the difficult economic transitions. 
Hence despite displacing more than half of the workforce in the East and creating 
unemployment of from 12 to -, depending on how it is calculated, the standard-of-living of 
the vast majority of people in the East has actually improved. This may not be suffiaent to 
have made them happy, but it does have a paafying effect. And there are the German 
democratic political institutions and the political party system. Especially of note here is the 
work of the Party of Democratic Socialism, the renamed Socialist Unity Party, which has 
channelled the voices of those who have felt disenfranchised into the institutional structures 
of the West German state. Finally, there are the non-jural institutions which have taken up 
the task of reckoning with the GDR's past, especially historians through the investigations of 
the parliamentary Enquete-Kommission, private citizens who have read Stasi documents about 
their own private pasts made available through the Gauck-Authorities, and a proliferation of 
newspaper, television, and public forums for the discussion of discontents. Beyond these 
institutional contexts, how has retributive justice been taken up in everyday life? 
- During the last six y&, I have attended mariy public foiGG in Bkrfiniiid-I h-ve' 
watched many of the televised discussions. These serve as catalysts for reactions in homes or 
among small circles of friends in bars and restaurants. When opinion pollsters or political 
scientists remark on the silence concerning these issues, they are merely registering the final 
effects of intensive social involvements: watching, listening, and sometimes talking. "Silence" 
in this context is not passivity or disinterest but a measured response to a public and private 
working-through of present injuries and past wounds. To explain this response in terms of old 
culturalkt cliches-Germans historically just follow orders, they are a prototype of subaltern 
peoples-does not adequately explain the remarkable changes in postwar domestic 
'arrangements and public culture (Borneman 1992). Admittedly, these changes are more 
extensive in the metropolis Berlin than in .&taller provincial settings, and Germany is a country 
of primarily middlesized cities. Yet the cultural processes and events in Berlin exert a 
disproportionate influence on national developments, dqroportionate in numbers, in the 
setting of cultural trends, and in media coverage. 
Perhaps a good illustration of the audience reception to retributive justice is the 
changing reaction to the fate of particular perpetrators and victims in the public imagination. 
Two of the most prominent public figures identified in 1989 as perpetrators, Erich Honecker and 
Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski, have by 1996 disappeared from public attention. By 
contrast, one of figures most identified with the victims, B-1 Bohley, who lost much of her 
public following within a year of the revolution, is currently enjoying a renaissance. Both 
trends are direct indices of the effects of successful retributive justice. How have people I know 
followed these developments? After Erich Honecker voted himself out of office in October 
1990, he was forced to leave his home in Wandlitz, the Politburo residential compound he had 
built in an isolated forest an hour north of Berlin. Threatened by public scorn, with nowhere 
safe to stay, he and his wife took refuge in the home of a Lutheran minister outside Berlin. The 
newly reformed East German television and print media directed public anger and resentment to 
the governmental abuse of power, focusing on Honecker's Wandlitz compound and on the illegal 
trading activities of Schalck-Golodkowski for the regime. During this same period, Bohley, 
the moral dissident who helped bring about the regime collapse, was considered increasingly 
out-of-touch as she criticized people for the very materialism that led them to be discontented 
with the GDR 
Fearing arrest, Honecker fled to Moscow, but then the Federal Republic pressured 
Russia to send him back to Germany for trial. Hence he was denied refuge in the Chilean 
embassy in Moscow and returned to Berlin. He arrived only to discover that he had terminal 
cancer and would not likely live long enough for the prosecutors to be able to complete the case 
against him. After a brief stay in prison, public prosecutors released him to join his daughter 
- 
who was liGing in Chile, whdt hi effect &-& called e a e  as a political solution His death 
within a couple of years received little notice in the media, and no discussion among the people 
I know. When in the summer of 19% I asked people what they thought of Honecker, those in 
the East always mentioned embarrassment at having submitted to his petty rule, along with 
repression, a factor those in the West foregrounded in their comments. Nobody mentioned the 
base motives of hate, resentment, or revenge. By 1996, people who had expressed so much anger 
at Alexander Schaldc-Golodkowski (who was acquitted in his first trial but awaits others) 
were now satisfied that he was still under a kind of house and they were relatively 
unconcerned about his fate. As to the voices of victims, in 1995 and 19% the public esteem of 
Wbel Bohley and other former dissidents grew, acclaimed by people across the political 
spe- as they were acknowledged to be speaking from a position of dignity based on past 
moral actions on the side of "the good." In other words, an actual dosing of the books is 
occurring, a thick line is being drawn, but only through a ritual purification 
This closing of the books does not imply that memory of the past will be accurate and 
continuous but merely increases the likelihood for a future affirmation of the prinaples of the 
rule of law. In the meantime, many reminders of this past will be erased. Such is the fate of 
the Wandlitz compound, which I visited in the summer of 19%. Surrounded by a barbed wire 
fence falling quiddy in disrepair, the small petty-bourgeois-looking single-family houses of 
the former Politburo members have been totally renovated and integrated into a large state-run 
health spa. All that remains that might remind one of its former use is the large metal 
entrance gate in unmistakable Socialist Realist style. During the summer, a small van is 
parked outside selling maps of the former government compound, a few books, and GDR 
memorabilia. Large numbers of private condominiums are under construction, but the settlement 
is now centered around an already-completed six-story health spa, complete with fountain, 
swimming pool, cafe, and well-kept s t r o h g  paths in the forest. People on crutches recovering 
from accidents or needing longterm physical therapy wander the grounds with their entire 
families in tow. When I asked where Honecker's house was, people directed me to it, but it is 
totally unmarked. I engaged a couple leaving the house in a brief conversation; they expressed 
no anger, no resentment The complex is theirs to recover in from an automobile accident The 
historical kindling used to ignite future fires is gone. 
When I told a friend, who had always been skeptical about a judicial reckoning with 
the past, about ZERV's most recent report, she remarked, "That is pleasing to hear, John. It 
gives one faith that the justice system is working after all." Her non-eventful deference to the 
state's legitimacy is in stark contrast to the eventful turn to violence by those who reject state 
legitimacy to settle accounts. This reaction resembles that of others: there is no reference to the 
technical categories I have employed, but there is an appreciation of what Kittlaus called 
-. - -  - 
"Redi6gefiih1," a respect for legality. Another woman comm&t&d on the rea&n of her two 
children, ages 16 and 19, 'They are uninterested in that. They only want to have fun. Fully 
depoliticized. And they are not womed about the future, they take things in stride." For the 
moment, the young heirs to the transformations are not dmding theix energies against anybody 
or in critique of anything in particular but instead toward their own projects in self-fulfiUment. 
Even if one does not subscribe to this attitude toward life, one must recognize that these young 
people have an impliat trust in the Rechtsstaat as providing the framework in which to 
experience their freedoms. 
In November 1994, ZERV published a small, slick, green bulletin of eleven pages. It is 
meant both to inform the public about the work ZERV already is doing and to involve citizens 
in the criminal justice process by asking for their help in investigating aiminal activity. It 
lists a telephone number to call to obtain or provide information, which in the first 12 months 
following publication resulted in 150 callers (ZERV 1996: 8). For the bulletin's cover ZERV 
(1994) chose the slogan: 'When victims are silent everything always begms again from the 
start" ("Wenn die Opfer schweigen, b e p t  alles immer wieder von vom") The current German . 
reckoning with the injustices of a particular past through criminal law is a counter-experiment 
to the silence-induced terror which engulfed Germany, Japan, and Italy in the 19705-a 
terrorism that can be understood as retaliation for the crimes committed by the Axis powers in 
World War II! In other words, to avoid a cycle of retributive violence and state insecurity it 
may be wise to go through a longer phase of painful historical reckoning with the past, that is, 
of retributive justice in the present. 
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